




In contrast to divination, science fiction or even common-or-garden prediction, futurology, as a disci-
pline, stands out by virtue of its global approach and vision, the way in which it takes account of both 
qualitative and quantitat ive elements and, above all, the variety of different possible futures it 
yields. This discipline, which has for a long t ime remained little-known, is increasingly becoming the 
stock-in-trade of debates on the future intended to guide present-day action. The few futurological 
studies tha t have received public attention have been interpreted as ringing alarm bells. Examples 
would be the 1971 Club of Rome report (The Limits to Growth), the 1987 World Commission on 
Environment and Development report (Our Common Future) , the Worldwatch Institute 's annual 
'State of the World' reports and, to a lesser extent, the 1994 report by the Commission on Global 
Governance. 
What is less well known is the fact tha t futurology is extensively used by big business (primary 
industry, t ransport and energy in particular) and governments (for example the Office of 
Technological Assessment and the Research Inst i tutes in the USA, the Economic Planning Agency in 
Japan and the Commissariat au plan in France) and tha t a large number of university and private 
institutes are involved in futurology. 
Another little-known fact is that , despite being a relatively new, globally oriented discipline, futuro-
logy bears features characteristic of the cultural traditions tha t produced them. Here I am thinking 
of the humanis t s t rand in Scandinavian futurology, the interdisciplinary approach in the French tra-
dition and the more business and production-oriented line taken in studies from Asia. 
An equally little-known fact is tha t the originally short-term and highly target-specific t rend in 
American futurological studies has, for some years now, been increasingly giving way to greater 
consideration of atypical, irrational and disruptive factors as being inherent in the na tu re of life. 
This trend, which is becoming increasingly apparent in Europe too, aims at combining the best of 
divinatory traditions and post-war commitment to scientific method. With its focus on h u m a n 
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AN ETHICAL INSPIRATION 
FOR EUROPE 
Santiago de Compostela, 7-8 May 1997 
ralism and respect for others and their diffe­
ring convictions itself constituted a valuable 
ethical position. Recognising this fact was the 
crucial first step on the way to establishing the 
consensus on values that needed to be found. 
J 
In 7-8 May the fourteenth Carrefour des 
sciences et de la culture was held in 
Santiago de Compostela, the capital of the nor­
thern Spanish region of Galicia. The main 
theme on this occasion was the «ethical dimen­
sion» of European integration. As is always the 
case at such conferences, the participants 
came from the most diverse walks of life and 
reflected the widest possible range of views 
and beliefs. 
It was Marcelino Oreja who had suggested 
that the Carrefour discuss the ethical basis of 
the European Union. As the Member of the 
Commission responsible for cultural affairs 
and institutional matters, he continually deals 
with questions relating to the meaning and 
essence of the European venture. However, 
there can be no doubt that his third area of 
responsibility, which includes information and 
communication, also leads him to consider 
questions of this kind. The Santiago Carrefour 
was held jus t a few weeks before the 
Amsterdam summit and the conclusion of the 
Intergovernmental Conference, which he had 
been attending throughout on behalf of the 
Commission, and he wanted to use the occa­
sion to give a signal and make clear that all 
the negotiators' efforts, all the compromises, 
all the formulations, articles and institutional 
safeguards would count for nothing unless 
they expressed the values underlying the poli­
cy of European integration. 
Given the considerable ethical differences and 
the prevailing pluralism of values, however, 
could it be assumed that the fundamental 
beliefs shared by the founding fathers fifty 
years ago were still relevant? There was broad 
agreement that the European tradition of plu-
VALUES MUST BE MADE EXPLICIT 
M η Santiago there was no disagreement on this point either: if the objective of politi­
cal union was to be successfully accomplished, 
there had to be an ethical inspiration, itself 
necessarily deriving from such shared values. 
Above all, an ethic is needed to underpin inte­
gration policy with regard to the Europe that 
has still to be built. This ethic will require of 
the institutions, especially Parliament and the 
Commission, that they define and redefine the 
priorities and the reasons for European inte­
gration, giving due prominence to active 
endeavours to maintain peace in Europe and 
the world at large. 
But the Europe that has already taken shape 
also desperately needs ethical inspiration. 
Without it the Union as a political community 
can have no long-term future; with it, on the 
other hand, it would at the very least be great­
ly strengthened. If a catalogue of civil rights 
and liberties, including basic social rights, 
were to be incorporated into the Treaty, the 
ethical contours of the Union would be more 
clearly defined and Union policies, which until 
now have largely been driven by economic 
considerations, would carry more conviction. 
Of course, it is not enough simply to establish 
that there is a need for such an ethic. The 
values and principles that could and should 
inspire the European integration process also 
need to be made explicit. 
Looking back at the founding of the European 
Community in the early fifties, it is easy to 
identify peace, reconciliation, tolerance, soli-
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darity, justice and freedom as the influential 
and motivating principles, values which had 
been rediscovered through the terrible expe-
rience of a war arising from untrammelled 
nationalism and a totalitarian ideology that 
placed little value on human dignity. Together, 
these values formed the framework for an 
ethical consensus, which in turn provided the 
basis for the process of European integration 
and its most important concrete achievement, 
the Community/Union. 
The problems facing us both now and in the 
future invite us to revive and perhaps to reap-
praise these principles. They are just as indis-
pensable to the Union today as they were to 
the Community in those early decades. But in 
view of the challenges now before us, these 
principles need to be interpreted and applied 
in a more general manner. For nowadays the 
basic problem is no longer how to maintain 
peace between European peoples and States, 
but rather how to maintain social peace, which 
is threatened by poverty, exclusion and the 
loss of solidarity, and at the same time world 
peace, which is threatened by the glaring dif-
ferences between rich and poor continents. 
Today, therefore, the major issue is reconcilia-
tion and the reconstruction of justice and soli-
darity within European societies and within 
"world society." With this in mind, to prevent 
society from fragmenting at various levels and 
to overcome social injustice (which leads to 
unrest and the loss of freedom), the rule of law 
must be established everywhere as the basis 
for peaceful coexistence, especially in the glo-
bal context of "One World." 
ETHIC OF RESPONSIBILITY 
oing beyond the principles that have tra-
ditionally provided the basis for the pro-
cess of European integration, social and politi-
cal responsibility is gaining ground as a gui-
ding principle for European policy in a chan-
ged context. This can be seen, for example, in 
the importance attached to subsidiarity, whe-
reby local and regional authorities assume 
responsibility for matters at their particular 
level and thus share responsibility for resol-
ving problems at other levels. Members of the 
general public have a similar degree of auto-
nomy when attempting to find appropriate 
solutions to problems in the areas for which 
they have chosen to take responsibility. 
Growing awareness of a direct responsibility 
towards future generations, necessitating a 
constant search for "sustainable" develop-
ment, is also part of this picture. The same 
applies to the concept of equal and considera-
te partnership, which is being advocated in 
many areas of life (from marriage and the 
family to the world of work and social rela-
tions). And, last but not least, this new politi-
cal ethic is expressing itself in responsibility 
towards the less-favoured members of society 
and in international solidarity towards those 
continents, countries and peoples whose 
poverty has prevented them from attaining a 
satisfactory level of development consistent 
with human dignity. 
This call for an ethic of responsibility is not, of 
course, directed exclusively at institutions. 
Responsibility must also be borne by the indi-
vidual, who in turn needs to be encouraged by 
institutional measures to make a contribution, 
to participate and to take responsibility within 
the framework that citizenship of the Union 
should provide. 
Such was the scope of the discussions that 
took place at the Santiago de Compostela 
Carrefour, where a host of European topics 
and socio-political problems were debated 
from an ethical viewpoint. The discussions 
clearly showed that the progressive integra-
tion of national societies and State structures 
within the Union framework and the coming 
enlargement of the Union to the East create 
an obligation not merely to recognise but also 
to proclaim the identity of a Europe that is in 
the process of achieving unification. In the 
humanistic and individualistic tradition of 
European democracies, this identity must be 
defined in open terms which avoid all ethnic, 
national or religious references that might be 
a source of bias or exclusion. The image which 
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the European Union has of itself can be seen 
not least in the values that form the basis of 
the European model of society and the 
European constitutional order, and in the 
national versions thereof. Awareness of these 
values must be stimulated again and again by 
naming and justifying them, so that they can 
provide reliable ethical guidance for the atti­
tudes and actions of Europeans. 
Thomas JANSEN / Jérôme VIGNON — ■ 
THE PARTICIPANTS 
* José Maria Gil Robles, President of the European 
Parliament 
* Manuel Fraga, MinisterPresident of Galicia 
* Carlo Martini, Cardinal of Milan 
* Maria Jepsen, Lutheran bishop 
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* Jean Kahn, chairperson of the Committee on Xenophobia 
and Racism 
* Maria­Lourdes Pintasilgo, former Minister­President of 
Portugal 
* Gesine Schwan, political analyst 
* Bronislav Geremek, historian and politician 
* Jean Yves Calvez, Jesuit 
* Olivier Abel, Protestant philosopher 
* Johan Verstraeten, Catholic professor of ethics 
* Esa Saarinen, sociologist 
* Gilbert Trausch, historian 
* Arij A. Roest Crollius, Jesuit 
* Inge Lönning, Protestant theologist 
* Janne Haaland Matlary, political analyst 
* Julian Barrio Barrio, Bishop of Santiago 
* Juan Antonio Carillo Salcedo, legal expert 
* Oligario Gonzales de Cardenal, Catholic theologist 
* Marcelino Oreja, Member of the European Commission 
WHICH MODEL OF SOCIETY 
FOR EUROPE ? 
Munich, 21­22 November 1996 
he Carrefour européen des sciences et de 
la culture of Munich was dominated by 
the common concern about how to develop 
Europe as a place for democracy, political free­
dom, high economic performance and social 
solidarity all at once. If the European model of 
society is about an equilibrium between diffe­
ring values and social, economic and political 
forces, and if this equilibium is in danger, then 
Europe has to find ways to re­establish the 
balance. 
The question concerning the possible future 
appearance of European society excites the 
imagination and brings out all sorts of ideas. 
While the 1992 Carrefour in Lausanne about 
«the European model of society» wallowed in 
discussions about what constitutes a «model» 
and what especially makes up «the European 
model», the Munich Carrefour made rather 
more progress. Participants started from the 
premise that some kind of European model of 
society does exist and discussed concepts for 
its future development. 
An historical review was first used to show up 
what may be specific European characteristics 
in societal developments. Political, economic, 
social and philosophical notions were identi­
fied which describe a European model of socie­
ty. The rule of law, universal human rights, 
economic performance and high productivity 
coupled with different forms of the welfare 
state, as well as ideas about the liberty and 
dignity of man were all included. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF EQUILIBRIUM 
S t the beginning of the discussion it was stressed that during the Renaissance the 
European model of society was founded on 
equilibrium between its constituting elements: 
the Church, the Municipality, and the Market. 
However, some participants complained that 
today the market formed the dominant ele­
ment. Other participants thought that the 
equilibrium in the European model of society 
in more recent times, and still today, is bet­
ween the market economy and the welfare 
state, founded on a triangle of state, trade 
unions, employers; it forces all those who play 
a role in this triangle to cooperate. Europe had 
only been able to face up to the challenges of 




However, the equilibrium between the market 
economy and the welfare state is in danger. 
The corollary of a strong belief in the merits of 
the social model is a fear of losing them, 
posing a number of challenges which need to 
be overcome. 
• New geopolitical conditions: The profound 
geo-political change can bring about even the 
risk of possible disaggregation of the Euro-
Atlantic partnership and certainly the threat 
of ecological and social dumping coming from 
the Eastern European countries. However, in 
change there lies also an opportunity to 
rebuild the whole European continent as a 
continental democracy. 
• Globalisation: In a world of globalisation, be 
it in the economy, in the media or in commu-
nications, the European model of society is 
held up to critical comparison which does not 
only include economic, but also cultural and 
political rivalry. 
• Internal threats: From the inside the 
European model of society also encounters 
several challenges. There are independent fac-
tors such as organised crime, social exclusion, 
the growth of intolerance and exacerbated 
nationalisms and the persecution of national 
minorities, which are disturbing contempora-
ry European societies. At the same time, the 
welfare state has sown the seeds of its own 
decline by creating a culture of dependence. 
The discussion about the future of a European 
model of society led to ideas about a civil socie-
ty which is based on the notion of solidarity. 
Starting off with a diagnosis of the financial, 
social and cultural crises of the present welfa-
re state, it was proposed to create an institu-
tional and social framework which fosters 
social commitment and thus the creation, so to 
speak, of a welfare society rather than a wel-
fare state. Responsibility for the weak in socie-
ty would not be the sole responsibility of the 
state, but also of the private sector. 
The aim of developing a new or re-newed 
society should be - according to some of the 
participants - the re-establishment of an equi-
librium between economic productivity and 
social welfare, between individualism and soli-
darity, between the individual and the com-
munity. The critera for judging the new model 
should be economic and political efficiency as 
well as political and juridical legitimacy and 
social justice. Anew equilibrium should lead to 
social and cultural cohesion in Europe and 
would determine the success of the European 
model of society both internally and in the 
eyes of the world. 
Perhaps a blend of market and democratic 
principles would help to find a new equili-
brium? Referring to an interpretation of the 
market as an expression of liberty, it was pro-
posed to consider the market as a forum for 
the participation of citizens, as well. 
Futhermore, the extension of participatory 
democracy could be the best way of achieving 
economic proficiency. Europe should embrace 
the idea that economic performance is based 
on social participation. A new European model 
of society has to be first and foremost a model 
of participation and dialogue, in order to find 
a consensus. 
CONCEPTS FOR THE FUTURE 
o achieve consensus, the economic, social 
security, juridical and political systems 
have to undergo some change which could be 
illustrated by some of the following considera-
tions. 
• The economic system: One important thing 
could be the interlocking of the welfare sector 
and the enterprise sector. For example, addi-
tional markets, separate from the formal eco-
nomy, could become a source of employment 
based on non-monetary forms of exchange. 
Such ideas reinforce the logic of redefining 
economic activity to include non-economic 
activity, especially domestic work. 
• The social security system: Most participants 
stressed that public as well as private actors 
should participate in the social security sys-
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tem. However, the extent of private or public 
engagements and the institutional and legal 
framework for the social system were rather 
controversial aspects of the debate. 
Some intellectuals stressed the importance of 
personal commitment as opposed to state 
action in a cohesive society. Individual social 
service should become part of everybody's 
worklife. The principle of reciprocity has to be 
applied in the field of welfare payments. 
Recipients of social benefit should in return 
give some social service to the community. 
The legal experts rejected the idea of solidari-
ty without rights and warned that Europe 
should not follow such a path because, without 
rights, solidarity became charity and the wel-
fare state a benefactor state. They agreed that 
not only should the state define and organise 
the respect of social rights, but all sectors of 
society shall play a part as well. However, they 
demanded a definition of social rights in suffi-
ciently clear terms so that these rights can be 
made subject to jurisdiction. 
In contrast to this, other participants refused 
any institutionalisation of solidarity, because 
it would discourage the active participation of 
citizens and would undermine pluralism. They 
refused welfare state bureaucracy as well as 
simple individualism and proposed schemes 
such as private insurance or mutual funds ins-
tead. 
Some experts stressed the importance of edu-
cation in order to ensure equality of opportu-
nity and to combat unemployment. 
Subsidising those people, who cannot pay for 
further education themselves could enable 
them to improve their position in society by 
acquiring new skills and knowledge. 
This argument was challenged by the state-
ment that giving money to people does not 
guarantee that the donations are properly 
spent. It was suggested instead to give to eve-
ryone the right to choose, that is to increase 
consumer's choice also for the poor. This could 
be by achieved lowering total labour lists by 
the state relief on wage taxes. 
• The juridical system: With reference to the 
debate on whether social solidarity should be 
institutionalised in the form of some sort of 
legally-defined social rights, it was agreed 
that without such an operational definition, 
high flown declarations on rights cannot be 
enforced: in order to lay claim to social rights, 
one has to be able to rely on codified laws. 
Such a codification at the European level 
would not allow differing models at lower 
levels of government. 
The new model of society could include a new 
form of European citizenship, which is better 
developed on the issues of participatory demo-
cracy and work. Employment and education 
are, in this perspective, the keys to benefitting 
from European citizenship. 
• The political system: In the political sphere 
the rethinking of the role of state authorities 
will have to continue. «Decentralisation» is the 
key word, but the participants understood it in 
different senses, either in the sense of geogra-
phical devolution or in that of delegation or 
even relinquishment of roles. In reverse, the 
role of the civil society would become more 
pronounced. 
The profound change of the role of the state 
was mentioned in this context. Central autho-
rities will have to think about their own role. 
The claim that the centralised welfare state 
possesses, as a matter of principle, all the 
necessary competences, will have to be given 
up. Authorities working as arbiters bringing 
different actors in society together will emer-
ge. In the same line of thought a greater role 
for the towns and municipalities was propo-
sed. They could be the best authorities to offer 
room for manoeuvre and initiative on the part 
of the citizens. To let this happen, the local 
authorities' competences in the field of social 
policy should be furthered. 
However, there remains a doubt about a limi-
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ted role of the state in a cohesive society. 
Although conceding that the state cannot play 
the role of the sole social actor, the legal 
experts stressed that it should keep to itself 
the exercise of sovereign power. 
There were also pessimistic views about the 
feasibilty of the concepts of cohesive societies: 
in reality people are too individualistic; the 
creation of a cohesive society would imply 
changing people; also the idea of a participato-
ry democracy is bound to fail as in general 
only a minority is willing to participate in poli-
tics and society. Therefore, the new model of 
society would suffer from a lack of legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, several participants did not 
consider these difficulties as unsurmountable 
obstacles. They stressed tha t the new 
European project would just take time to deve-
lop. Others put their hopes on local participa-
tion of citizens, which would help to create a 
wider willingness to participate. 
THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The Carrefour in Munich could not, of course, 
give a comprehensive and definite answer to 
the question it had raised. However, many of 
the elements that have to be considered before 
reaching a lasting consensus were discussed. 
Furthermore, it became quite clear that the 
search for this consensus constitutes in itself 
an important part of that model which the 
Europeans must define. Their national models 
are getting obviously obsolete as they do not 
fit anymore with the dimensions requested by 
the transnational and multicultural European 
context in which their societies are embedded 
today. On the other hand, these national 
models which are strongly determined by their 
respective cultural heritages as well as by the 
constitutional and political traditions of the 
Member States are very present in the debate 
and must be respected. It is therefore worth-
wile to try, in a Carrefour composed of people 
from different countries and representing not 
only different academic disciplines but also 
different cultural sensibilities, to find out how 
to convincingly design the «European model of 
society». 
m 
n order to promote and to defend a 
European model of society it was recom-
mended that the Union improves its capacities 
to find and to apply solutions concerning its 
social problems and that, at the same time, 
the Europeans play a more active role in the 
world. 
The hope was expressed that by finding a new 
internal equilibrium the Union could be able 
to work for a world-wide equilibrium, and a 
new form of global governance, which ought to 
be characterised by the reciprocity of cultural 
and political exchange. In this spirit, it was 
stated that the values of the European model 
of society can translate themselves into acts of 
international solidarity. Therefore it is crucial 
not to be introspective about what differen-
tiates Europe from others; but to make the 
most of the influence of Europe's model in the 
world at large. 
Wolfgang BUECHERL / Thomas JANSEN 
THE PARTICIPANTS 
Warnfried DETTLING, publicist 
Heinrich OBERREUTER, political scientist 
Michel DUMOULIN, historian 
Teresa FRELXES, constitutionnalist 
Fernando VALDES RE, lawyer 
Tuire SANTAMÄKI-VUORI, researcher 
Valérie PEUGEOT, general delegate 
Frances GARDINER, political scientist 
Paola ANTOLINI, anthropologist 
Mario TELO, political scientist 
Janne HAALAND, philosopher 
Agnès KOERTS, journalist 
Maria Regina TAVARES DA SILVA, adviser on equal 
chances 
John KAY, economist 
Amin ASH, geographer 
Bo ROTHSTEIN, political scientist 
Alfred MUSCHG, writer 
Edmund STOIBER, President of Bavarian Government 
Jacques SANTER, President of the European 
Commission 
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OMNI-LATERALISM 
WITH EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE 
n a nutshell and at the risk of simplifica-
tion, one can say that in the objectives and 
goals of their East Asia policies, the European 
Union and the United States share an overri-
ding interest in the opening of markets, ensu-
ring competition in trade, and supporting fun-
damental rights and democracy. 
However, as for the method to implement such 
goals, there seem to be differences between the 
extremes of the confrontational «unilateralism» 
of a superpower on a world-wide mission and 
the long-range consensus-building of a soft 
power in the making. In addition, the indivi-
dualistic and pragmatic case-orientation of the 
Anglo-Saxons sometimes diverges from the 
continental-Europeans' more dogmatic tenacity. 
The ideal Western combination hence would be 
a transatlantic understanding on the common 
goals with a mutual complementarity in the 
methodology to implement them vis-à-vis East 
Asia. Thereby, there would be neither a basis for 
any «ganging up» by the West against the Rest 
nor for a «divide et impera» by third partners. 
In theory, there exist plenty of opportunities for 
concrete cooperation in the Triad to set positive 
examples to lead to global governance in a mul-
tilateral framework. 
Unfortunately, however, in practice such coope-
ration (e.g. recently in part on deregulation in 
Japan) seems to be rather the exception than 
the rule. It is a fact that differences in the 
method can also impact the objectives. For ins-
tance, the Anglo-Saxon case-by-case approach 
limits changes to be expected in the structure of 
a system (e.g. Kodak and Japanese distribu-
tion). Another illustration of such divergences 
relates to preference for meagre short-term 
results with immediate political effect through 
the media (for «quarterly reports») instead of 
more profound changes inducing cooperation in 
the long-term (e.g. imposition of dealerships for 
cars or internationalisation of standards; sen-
ding expatriates or training managers on the 
spot). 
DEATH OF DISTANCE 
SI uch differences already in the approach within the West and even wider divergen-
ce from other civilisations has led me to coin a 
new expression of «omni-lateralism» as the 
result of a long-term reflection on global gover-
nance in the future. In order to prevent not only 
the foreshadowed «clashes of civilisations», but 
also avoid conflicts with emerging cultures, the 
existing Western-made multilateral system 
must open up to and encompass new members' 
basic understanding and integrate it into its 
thereby all-comprising rules. 
Japan as the first successful non-Western eco-
nomy in GATT (politically not commensurately 
active?), now South-Korea in OECD (labouring 
with Labour Laws) and probably soon much 
more so China in WTO (fata morgana?) with 
their ingrained societal particularities overs-
tretch and dilute the Western concepts under-
lying these multilateral bodies. Not the absolu-
tism of Fukyama's claimed «End of History,» but 
the forces of pertinent, traded cultural notions 
and new patterns of communication («death of 
distance»)1 are too strong to be any longer 
neglected in global governance. 
Just to give one concrete example on the highly 
topical issue of protection of the environment: 
The old Buddhist principles of interdependence 
in nature and cycles of reincarnation lend them-
selves much better to understand the need for 
recycling than our Western illusion of creation 
from zero. Holistic views of nature would rather 
conserve, whereas our analytical approaches 
would often tend to divide, before finding com-
mon ground. 
While for the emerging countries modernisation 
does not necessarily anymore mean 
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Westernisation, only with them participating as 
really pro-active stake-holders can we construct 
world bodies which are not only Western multi-
lateral, but truly «omnibus», i.e. for all. This, of 
course, does not at all exclude the existence of 
universal fundamental values, as then agreed 
upon by all omni-laterally. Otherwise from an 
oriental cuckoo's egg dragon(s) might emerge 
and impose their own rules on others. 
For Europe as «Weltkind in der Mitten»2 bet-
ween the extremes of «American 
Exceptionalism»3 and Japanese «yunikusa»,4 
then naturally there evolve opportunities to 
assume a stronger role as mediator. The Cold 
War had strengthened the alliance between 
Europe and America, but left a «missing link» 
with Asia. Now starting with ASEM, the Asia-
Europe Meetings started in March 1996 and its 
follow-up, it is high time and presently a win-
dow of opportunity that the «Weltkind» regains 
its balance in an omni-lateral framework! 
Wolfgang PAPE 
1 Expression borrowed from The Economist referring to the 
«global village» 
2 Expression borrowed from a letter from Goethe to 
Charlotte von Stein 
3 Title of a book by Seymour Lipset, N.W. Norton & 
Company, NY, 1996 
4 Japanese term used to describe the uniqueness or excep-
tionality of something 
MEASURING PROGRESS TOWARDS 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
Ü ccording to public opinion the environment protection policies of the Union have been 
quite popular and effective. Satisfactory as that 
may be, it would be better still for the public to 
have a measure of the contribution which this 
effort has made towards a more sustainable 
model of development. In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the Commission felt more and 
more the need for some clear measures which 
could be used to gauge progress. Good and pre-
cise measures of progress would probably be a 
big help in determining which areas of environ-
mental protection policy would need the most 
attention in future; and in which sectoral poli-
cies environmental concerns needed to take a 
higher profile. 
Against this background, the FSU was asked to 
thrash out the problem of how to measure 
actual progress towards a more sustainable 
development model. There were numerous and 
sometimes heated meetings with inside and 
outside experts, academics, industry represen-
tatives, policy professionals, and non-govern-
mental organisations before we could arrive at 
our choice as to how best to do this. 
WHY WAS IT SO COMPLICATED ? 
he first problem encountered was that, 
although everybody intuitively knows 
what «sustainable development» means in a 
broad sense, it is in fact excruciatingly difficult 
to define the expression in terms precise enough 
for policy professionals to use; far less for the 
methodologically meticulous statisticians who 
would actually have to produce the measures of 
progress towards it. At the time we started, we 
counted over 70 working definitions of «sustai-
nability»; and today there are even more. To 
resume this problem: if you're not quite decided 
on the nature of your goal, it's not obvious how 
to measure your progress. The second problem 
was the apparent shortage of the raw data 
which would have to be used to construct indi-
cators, once one had decided which indicators 
were going to be useful. 
In fact, a large proportion of the environmental 
statistics which do exist in Europe today have 
only been collected as a consequence of the 
introduction of environmental legislation, 
which generally includes reporting require-
ments. This leaves us relatively bereft of data 
which could be needed insofar as one were to 
want to include issues which had not yet been 
the subject of national or European legislation. 
Improving data availability would also imply 
some costs for the statistical services of the 
member States; which meant that these organi-
sations also had to be convinced of the useful-
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ness and appropriateness of the indicators we 
would compile. This was not easy, because some 
member States had already made choices of 
their own about what to measure in their own 
national contexts, and were quite far advanced 
with their own preparations; while other mem-
ber States were still very much in a learning 
phase. 
USER-FRIENDLY MEASURES 
he key to resolving the problems in deter-
mining what measures the Commission 
should use was, in retrospect, very simple: user-
friendliness. The measures should be usable by 
the general public - or a t least by journalists - so 
tha t progress, or lack of it, is easy to communi-
cate; and the measures should be suitable for 
immediate use in the policy depar tments most 
likely to be concerned, such as environment pro-
tection, t ransport , and energy. 
The choice which the Commission then made, 
and which was s trongly endorsed by the 
European Parl iament, can essentially be resu-
med in three points1: 
• The Union shall have logically consistent sets 
of environmental indicators which measure the 
pressure which we place on our environment, 
which describe the corresponding state of the 
environment, and which measure the response 
we are mounting as a result of changes in the 
first two. Experts in the field will recognise this 
so-called pressure-state-response model which 
is, incidentally, popular within the OECD. Each 
indicator (one for noise, for example) will be 
constructed in a modular fashion which allows 
the matching of each module to the correspon-
ding economic sectors, notably to those which 
generate the pressures (the relatively noisy 
t r anspo r t and construct ion sectors, for 
example). 
• The Union shall have «satellite accounts», so 
as to be able to get a complete picture of the pro-
gress, or lack of it, towards sustainable resour-
ce management . Normally, the national accoun-
tan ts ' way of accounting for na tura l resources is 
incomplete because only financial or «market» 
transactions are recorded in the account. This 
can be put right in «satellite accounts». For 
example, the forest satellite account will inclu-
de not only the economic transactions of the sec-
tor which contribute to the economy, but also its 
non-market contributions such as generation of 
ameni ty; the w a t e r satel l i te account will 
account for changes in the value of water assets 
caused by quality changes, and for their deple-
tion; and so on. These satellite accounts will 
also be constructed in a fashion which allows 
the i r match ing to b ranch accounts and 
input/output tables. 
• Attempts to combine «social» sustainability 
concerns with environmenta l sus ta inabi l i ty 
concerns shall be a mat ter for research. Our 
very considerable research effort on the exter-
nal costs of the energy sector will also be pur-
sued and will contribute data and methodologi-
cal insights to the work on pressure indices and 
satellite accounts. 
These choices do have the attraction tha t the 
measures will be user-friendly. A user, such as a 
member of Par l iament or a policy administrator 
certainly wants to know not only wha t the s tate 
of the environment is, and whether the pressu-
re on it is increasing or not; but also to be able 
to make the connection between any change in 
pressure on the one hand, and the economic sec-
t o r s ) , which cause tha t on the other hand. 
Knowing the «real» value of a na tura l resource, 
as measured in a satellite account, will also help 
in reflecting on whe the r or not n a t u r a l 
resources deserve more protection. Of course, 
not every decision can or even should be redu-
ced to cold appraisal of costs and benefits - deci-
sions can for example be so expensive tha t they 
really only can be taken «in the hea t of the 
moment» such as in the aftermath of an acci-
dent. Most probably this is going to be the pat-
tern more and more in the future. Nevertheless, 
carefully-prepared indicators and satel l i te 
accounts of the type selected by the Commission 
do strike us as fulfilling a definite need for 
direct users and for the public at large. 
«SUSTAINABILITY» 
WHAT DOES IT MEAN ? 
here are a number of important conceptual 
questions to be dealt with in deciding what 
you mean by «sustainable development» and 




Firstly, do you choose a «strong» or a «weak» 
definition of sustainability? In a «strong» one 
you assume a low substitutability between the 
natural and the man-made capital stocks which 
you want to hand on to the next generation; and 
in a «weak» one the substitutability is supposed 
to be high. If you choose a weak definition you 
might be relatively unconcerned about measu-
ring natural resource depletion, and thus not 
need to include it in your measures or indica-
tors, so long as the act of resource depletion crea-
ted some other wealth. If, on the other hand, you 
choose a strong definition, this implies inclu-
ding resource depletions as a negative item in 
the measure of progress towards sustainability. 
Another big choice is to know whether or not to 
mix in «social» sustainability factors as compo-
nents of the measure. For example, it is widely 
presumed in Europe that large income differen-
tials in a society would make that society a less 
«socially» sustainable one. Similarly, it is wide-
ly presumed in Europe that social and environ-
mental sustainability are linked, in that a cohe-
sive society is better able to make the changes 
needed to respect environmental constraints. If, 
therefore, one chooses to include social conside-
rations in the definition of sustainability, there 
are important consequences for the range of 
items that one has to measure when one wants to 
gauge progress towards a more sustainable 
model of development. 
A third question which often raised its head, 
and still does from to time, was to know whether 
or not it would be more practical simply to alter 
or to «correct» the best-known existing standard 
measure of progress, namely GDP, and produce 
some sort of «green GDP» as a measure of sustai-
nable economic development. 
A fourth question which merits a mention in this 
brief article is that of geographic scope: should 
we measure «sustainability» only within 
Europe's borders, knowing that we may be achie-
ving sustainability at home, but only by dint of 
«exporting» unsustainability onto the rest of the 
World? For example, some crops need a lot of 
water to produce, to the extent that producing 
them in regions of Europe where water resources 
are scarce may be «unsustainable». To switch to 
importing such crops instead of producing them 
in Europe does give an impression of improved 
sustainability within Europe. But if they are 
imported from countries where water resources 
are even less sustainably managed than in 
Europe, there has not been an overall improve-
ment - the problem has just been shifted elsew-
here. 
EFFORTS UNDERWAY 
he Commission is not of course by any 
means the only organisation which has 
been busy reflecting on what indicators of pro-
gress to use. There is substantial activity in the 
private sector, as large industrial firms and 
their associations seek alternative methods of 
measuring their performance otherwise than in 
purely cash terms: the currently fashionable 
terms like «stakeholders» and «benchmarking» 
assist this movement. There is also a big effort 
underway at global level: the Commission on 
sustainable Development (CSD) of the UN is pro-
posing a set of «indicators for sustainable deve-
lopment» which is now entering its «test» phase 
- which means to say that some indicators sets 
have been compiled for some countries, accor-
ding to the CSD's 1996 «blue book» methodology 
and now they can be tested for usefulness in the 
policy context. Efforts are underway at the level 
of national governments as well, as mentioned 
above; some of these adhere to UN methodology 
and scope and some, not surprisingly, depart 
from it. 
An interesting thing which emerges from all 
these efforts to select and test indicators (an 
«early harvest» of the Commission's own pres-
sure indicators and satellite accounts will come 
out in the next months) is that they are all 
always criticised for being «selective» as if all-
embracing aggregated indicators would some-
how be better. The very frequency of this criti-
cism seems in fact to illustrate something quite 
inescapable: that the sets of indicators which 
are suitable for use in policy guidance will 
always be selected according to the needs of the 
users, and that for the Commission to have gone 
ahead on this basis in 1994 was certainly no 
mistake. 
Looking to the future, what next? The earliest 
results of the environmental indicators and 
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«green» (satellite) accounts will soon be avai­
lable and will provide useful information. By 
being amongst the earliest, they are likely to 
provide something of a model for others to 
converge upon, to emulate, and no doubt impro­
ve upon. Looking further ahead, the Forward 
Studies Unit is wondering whether there is any 
danger of divergence rather than convergence 
in the methodological choices which can be 
made by indicator users. One would not want, 
for example, an industry's choice of methodolo­
gy (for example, how to aggregate pressure indi­
cators, or how to weight them in an index) so 
radically to differ from the regulators' methodo­
logy that it became difficult for the two to deli­
berate together. Conscious of this risk, the 
Forward Studies Unit is looking into the factors 
which guide the methodological choices now 
being made in the private sector. As yet, there 
are no signs of trouble. 
William FLOYD 
1 For more detail, one can refer to the Commission 
Communication COM(94)670: «Environmental indicators 
and green national accounting; directions for the EU». 
Miscellaneous 
NEW PUBLICATION 
«LA COMMISSION EUROPÉENNE 
À L'ÉCOUTE DU CHANGEMENT» 
ith a preface by Jacques Santer and a 
conclusion by Jacques Delors, this book, 
which is already in the shops1, is an account of a 
rather special event: the Leiden Seminar. This 
was held just before Jacques Delors left the 
Commission and brought together writers, philo­
sophers and politicians to discuss three major 
issues in European integration: identity, demo­
cracy and work. It was no easy task producing a 
report on the vast range of conflicting ideas 
expressed by intellectuals from 23 countries, 
representing some ten different social science 
disciplines, without misrepresenting the diversi­
ty of the points made or oversimplifying. 
But this was the task undertaken on behalf of 
the Forward Studies Unit by J. L. Arnaud2, who 
leads us through the debates, the thought provo­
king presentations and the wide ranging conclu­
sions. 
All those who took part in the Leiden Seminar 
were exposed to the cut and thrust of lively deba­
te. The same stirrings, like the very heartbeat of 
Europe, will be felt by anyone, along with the 
Commission, now reading Arnaud's account of 
the seminar. 
1 Available in French from sales outlets of the Office of 
Official Publications of the European Communities (2, rue 
Mercier ­ L ­ 2985 Luxembourg) and in bookshops from 
June 1997 (published by Apogée). 
2 Also author of an account of the Forward Studies Unit's 
first series of seminars, published in 1995 under the title 
«En quête d'Europe» (same publishers). 
Director of publication: 
Chief editor: 
Editorial committee: 
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